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OVERCOMING THE MYTH OF FREE WILL IN




Understanding the roots of current theoretical justifications for
criminal punishment is crucial in evaluating its susceptibility to future
change. In the American criminal justice system, the dominant justifi-
cation for punishing individuals is that offenders have made a volun-
tary choice to break the law, thus validating the imposition of a socie-
tal sanction. However, recent discoveries in the field of genetics have
called this theoretical assumption of individual, voluntary choice into
question. Because genetic influences on behavioral traits may raise
doubts about the nature of individual free will, some scientists have
concluded that various members of society may be less able to refrain
from breaking the law than others. Consequently, several commenta-
tors have suggested that this genetic research may shake the theoreti-
cal foundations of the criminal justice system to its core, and that a
radical reorganization of the system is inevitable. Other commenta-
tors have predicted that the changes will be more subtle, perhaps
manifesting themselves only in the context of specific criminal adjudi-
cations.
The American criminal justice system, however, is more resilient
and entrenched than either category of commentators suggests. Thus,
even though genetics research indicates that society should reexamine
some of its philosophical assumptions about the criminal justice sys-
tem and institute major systematic changes, nevertheless the Ameri-
can criminal justice system will likely not be dramatically altered. In-
stead, the resulting change will be a system that simply relies more on
utilitarian rationales to justify criminal punishment than it has in the
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past.1 This Note proceeds in several parts. Part I briefly summarizes
the relevant philosophical background of the American criminal jus-
tice system and its view of human behavior. Part II reviews current
genetic research and its impact on the parameters of this debate. Part
III explains how various commentators have viewed the ramifications
of genetic research in the criminal justice context, and Part IV offers a
brief critique of their analyses. Finally, Part V argues that punishment
justifications will become increasingly utilitarian.
I.  PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW
Crime is a socially constructed concept that can loosely be de-
fined as taking a particular action with a designated mental state, the
combination of which society has deemed punishable.2 Societies,
through their legislatures, decide which behaviors will be tolerated
and which will be prohibited. The latter are designated as crimes.3
Once an individual has chosen to commit a crime, and thus deviated
from proscribed societal norms, society mandates appropriate pun-
ishment. The imposition of a criminal sanction represents society’s
disapproval of the criminal’s disregard of the community’s values. It is
thus the “strongest formal condemnation that society can inflict on
wrongdoers.”4
Justifications for these sanctions—which may include taking an
individual’s liberty or life—go to the very heart of criminal justice
theory. In spite of this fact, courts and legislatures have treated the
theory of criminal punishment as a peripheral concern. It is “as if we
were clear about when it is correct to punish even if we cannot sort
out exactly why it is correct.”5 However, any evaluation of the cor-
1. I am not, of course, the first to suggest that a utilitarian justification for punishment is
the likely result of the “genetic revolution.” Maureen Coffey, for example, suggests that utili-
tarianism is the most justified system in light of discoveries showing the role that genetics plays
on human behavior. Maureen Coffey, Note, The Genetic Defense: Excuse or Explanation?, 35
WM. & MARY L. REV. 353, 394–98 (1993). My Note differs from Coffey’s note, however, be-
cause she sees utilitarian justification as being one of many changes that will likely occur, in-
cluding the use of genetic makeup as a mitigating factor in sentencing. Id. I see the likely ramifi-
cations of the genetic revolution as much more limited and subtle, and manifesting themselves
only on a philosophical basis, not in daily courtroom behavior.
2. Sanford H. Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 CAL. L. REV. 257, 258 (1987).
3. See Coffey, supra note 1, at 356–57 (explaining the process by which society turns un-
popular behavior into criminal activity).
4. GEORGE MOUSOURAKIS, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY AND PARTIAL EXCUSES 34
(1998).
5. Lloyd L. Weinreb, Desert, Punishment, and Criminal Responsibility, 49 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 50–51 (Summer 1986).
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rectness of this punishment must include an understanding of soci-
ety’s assumptions about human behavior. The American criminal jus-
tice system largely relies on the notion that individuals are responsi-
ble for their actions, and, thus, can be punished when they choose to
violate societal standards. In other words, American criminal juris-
prudence is firmly rooted in the concept of individual free will.6
A. Competing Philosophical Frameworks
The debate as to the ultimate causes of human action has been at
the core of Western philosophy for centuries.7 Most of this debate
centers upon what constitutes freedom of action, and whether an in-
dividual has the capacity to choose between alternatives.8 Although
there are numerous derivatives of these approaches, they can gener-
ally be divided into two overarching theories of human behavior: free
will and determinism.9
6. Both courts and commentators have acknowledged the role of free will in American
criminal justice. See People v. Wolff, 394 P.2d 959, 971 (Cal. 1964) (affirming that “the basic be-
havioral concept of our social order is free will”) (citations omitted); Richard C. Boldt, The
Construction of Responsibility in the Criminal Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 2245, 2247 (1992) (con-
tending that the criminal law creates and maintains a society based on the notion of free will);
Jonathan Glover, The Implications for Responsibility of Possible Genetic Factors in the Expla-
nation of Violence, in GENETICS OF CRIMINAL AND ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOR 237, 238 (1996)
(asserting that the “theoretical possibility of the truth of determinism should make us rather
more worried than we are”); Stephen J. Morse, Culpability and Control, 142 U. PA. L. REV.
1587, 1589 (1994) (asserting that “the criminal law presupposes precisely the folk psychological
account of human action based on desires, beliefs, intentions, and other mental states that re-
ductionist theories reject”); Ronald Rychlak & Joseph Rychlak, Mental Health Experts on Trial:
Free Will and Determinism in the Courtroom, 100 W. VA. L. REV. 193, 196 (1997) (noting that
the “legal system’s assumption of free will in human affairs is ubiquitous”). See generally John
L. Hill, Note, Freedom, Determinism, and the Externalization of Responsibility in the Law: A
Philosophical Analysis, 76 GEO. L.J. 2045 (1988) (considering the conflict between free will and
determinism, and arguing that, if determinism is correct, it is philosophically incoherent to hold
persons responsible for unavoidable acts).
7. Boldt, supra note 6, at 2254. The universality of this debate is striking as thinkers rang-
ing from Plato to Martin Luther to Jeremy Bentham to Immanuel Kant have all attempted to
understand the perplexities of human behavior and the process by which an individual under-
takes an action. Id.
8. Another way to phrase this conception of freedom is the ability of the individual to do
otherwise. Id.
9. Id. The debate between free will and determinism is one that includes many intricacies
and subclasses that are beyond the scope of this Note. It is simplistic to argue that this area of
rich and intricate human thought can be so crudely divided into two categories. Nevertheless,
the philosophical camps of free will and determinism are generally accepted because they do
highlight what is the line of division for most philosophers: whether humans control their ac-
tions. For a thorough elaboration of the intricacies of the debate, see generally FREE WILL AND
DETERMINISM (Bernard Berofsky ed., 1966).
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Free will theory contends that human behavior, when faced with
a given situation, is the result of individual choices made by autono-
mous actors.10 The theory assumes that individuals are unique ac-
tors—they have an inherent ability to choose or “choose not” when
confronted with specific environmental stimuli.11 It thus follows that,
with this choice, individuals can be held personally responsible for
their choices, and thus should face the consequences for their deci-
sions.12
In contrast, determinist theory sees human behavior quite differ-
ently. Determinists contend that individual action is to some degree
“caused” by factors outside of an individual’s control.13 These causal
forces might range from divine intervention to interactions between
social and biological factors. But, whatever they are, they compel
human behavior to some extent.14 Adherents to determinism vary
from “hard determinists,” who argue that all events are caused by
outside forces or independent biological, social, or psychological fac-
tors,15 to “soft determinists,” who concede that human behavior is
largely predictable, but assert that individuals still can exercise some
degree of choice in their actions.16 However each of these types of de-
terminists share the common belief that individual behavior cannot
be separated from outside, causal forces.
B. The Legal Choice to Assume Free Will
American legal jurisprudence has dealt very superficially with
these complex questions concerning the causes of human behavior.
Courts have shown little indication that they are willing to undertake
the difficult philosophical, biological, and psychological inquiry nec-
essary to truly formulate an understanding regarding the causes of
human behavior.17 While the policy goals for punishment may be con-
10. “Traditionally, an actor has been said to have acted freely (according to his or her free
will) if, with respect to a given act, he or she could have done otherwise.” Boldt, supra note 6, at
2254 n.24 (citing John M. Fischer, Introduction: Responsibility and Freedom, in MORAL
RESPONSIBILITY 9, 41 (John M. Fischer ed., 1986)).
11. Id. at 2254.
12. Hill, supra note 6, at 2045.
13. Boldt, supra note 6, at 2255.
14. See id. at 2255–58 (illustrating the factors that can influence an individual’s actions).
15. See Glover, supra note 6, at 239–42 (identifying the implications of the hard-determinist
viewpoint).
16. See id. (explaining the soft-determinist viewpoint).
17. When one reviews the cases in which courts attempt to create excuses or other excep-
tions to punishment, the result is striking. Courts tend to substantively debate the actual defense
being asserted (e.g., insanity, duress, alcoholism) but skip the initial analysis as to why these ex-
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tinuously debated,18 it is nevertheless clear that even absent this in-
quiry, the American legal system has shown a preference for free will
as the basis for its underlying philosophy.19 The Supreme Court ac-
knowledged this, saying that a “belief in freedom of the human will
and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose
between good and evil [is a belief that is] universal and persistent in
mature systems of law.”20 However, this legal preference is not based
in scientific precision about human behavior. It simply provides the
easiest and most convenient basis for constructing a base set of legal
principles.21 Professor Herbert Packer articulates this systemic choice
in this way:
The idea of free will in relation to conduct is not, in the legal system,
a statement of fact, but rather a value preference having very little
to do with the metaphysics of determinism or free will . . . . Very
simply, the law treats man’s conduct as autonomous and willed, not
because it is, but because it is desirable to proceed as if it were.22
While most areas of law carry free will as a base assumption,23 crimi-
nal law relies on it to an even greater degree because it provides a
philosophical basis for individual punishment. As in a Kantian legal
world, individuals should only have their liberty infringed if they have
undertaken an action that is based on choice and thus deserving of
punishment.24
cuses are different from normal modes of behavior. See, e.g., United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d
662, 693 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991) (setting forth the criteria for a suc-
cessful necessity defense); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 548 (1968) (holding that alcoholism
does not constitute a viable excuse to criminal action); United States v. Contento-Pachon, 723
F.2d 691, 692–93 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding a duress justification where an individual fled Colum-
bia with cocaine to avoid execution). One plausible explanation for this phenomenon is that
courts routinely assume that free will exists. But see United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139,
1150–53 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (setting forth an extensive analysis of the effect an individual’s lack of
free will may play upon criminal liability). For a more thorough analysis of this case, see infra
notes 92–97 and accompanying text.
18. The four general policy goals most often identified are deterrence, retribution, rehabili-
tation, and incapacitation. LAWRENCE TAYLOR, BORN TO CRIME 10–15 (1988).
19. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
20. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952).
21. See Richard Lowell Nygaard, Free Will, Determinism, Penology and the Human Ge-
nome: Where’s a New Leibniz When We Really Need Him?, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE
417, 421–22 (1996) (asserting that a criminal law system completely based on free will flies in the
face of common sense, yet perseveres).
22. HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 74–75 (1968).
23. See Rychlak & Rychlak, supra note 6, at 196 (citing wills, deeds, contracts, and confes-
sions as examples).
24. See MOUSOURAKIS, supra note 4, at 37 (discussing the criminal law’s refusal to punish
people for their bad characters outside the context of an action); Paul Robinson & John M.
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Additionally, because criminal law liability hinges on mens rea,
some courts and commentators assert that in our current criminal jus-
tice system “free will is an essential prerequisite to criminal liabil-
ity.”25 Nevertheless, courts almost never articulate a scientific or even
a metaphysical basis for this belief system. Rather, it is one based in
practicality and social order.26 Professors Franz Alexander and Hugo
Staub illustrate this point:
[W]e may for practical purposes hold the individual responsible for
his acts; that is to say, we assume an attitude as if the conscious Ego
actually possessed the power to do what it wishes. Such an attitude
has no theoretical foundation, but it has a practical, or still better, a
tactical justification.27
The free will assumption allows for easy administration of justice
and solves any tension that might exist between deterministic science
and normative criminal justice theory. It allows criminal jurispru-
dence to be foundationally constructed around the notion of human
decisionmaking control and corresponding personalized responsibil-
Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 455 (1997) (articulating the Kantian view
that punishment should follow only from a “just desert” rationale). Professor Meir Dan-Cohen
argues:
The core of criminal law doctrine, centered around the concept of mens rea and the
variety of criminal excuses, probably comes closer than any other set of social prac-
tices to an instantiation of the Kantian conception of the responsible human subject
as the noumenal self, characterized exclusively by a rational free will unencumbered
by character, temperament, and circumstance.
Meir Dan-Cohen, Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self, 105 HARV. L. REV. 959, 1003
(1992).
25. Rychlak & Rychlak, supra note 6, at 198 (quoting 1 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL
LAW DEFENSES § 25(a), at 91 n.2 (1984)). The Supreme Court expressed this belief favoring
free will as recently as 1977, stating that “[m]en usually intend to do what they do.” Brewer v.
Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 434 (1977).
26. Scholars express this view by asserting that the American criminal justice system is
based upon an “as if” theory. Michael S. Moore, Causation and Excuses, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1091,
1121 (1985). This approach accepts the view that most human behavior is determined by outside
causal factors, but prefers to treat human action “as if” there is complete freedom. Id. Philoso-
pher Jerome Hall articulates this view:
[Psychiatry] purports to be rigorously scientific and therefore takes a determinist po-
sition. Its view of human nature is expressed in terms of drives and dispositions which,
like mechanical forces, operate in accordance with universal laws of causation.
On the other hand, criminal law . . . is not a theoretical science whose sole con-
cern is to understand and describe what goes on. It is, instead, a practical, normative
science which, while it draws upon the empirical sciences, is also concerned to pass
judgment on human conduct.
Id. at 1121–22 (quoting JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 455 (2d ed.
1960)).
27. FRANZ ALEXANDER & HUGO STAUB, THE CRIMINAL, THE JUDGE, AND THE PUBLIC:
A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 72–73 (1931).
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ity. Not only does this allow courts to avoid the difficult task of deci-
phering the true root of all human behaviors, it also justifies another
key component of criminal justice theory: attributing blame to indi-
viduals.
The concept of blame allows society to rationalize its infliction of
punishment on a criminal wrongdoer. Whenever society decides to
punish a criminal, the goal (either primarily or secondarily) is to in-
flict pain and suffering on the individual.28 Such punishment can only
be levied under circumstances when the individual truly deserves it.
Society would consider it wrong to inflict pain and suffering on a
blameless individual. By assuming that individuals possess free will
when they go against the legal norms and standards of society, the
necessary level of culpability and blameworthiness is met.29
C. The Free Will Assumption As Applied
Assumptions about free will can be made at two distinct times in
the prosecution of a suspected offense: at trial and at sentencing. To
convict a defendant, the general rule is that the criminal act charged
must have been committed voluntarily.30 If the defendant acted invol-
untarily, the defendant cannot be said to have exercised free will.
Thus, in some cases, the courts may hold that the defendant has a
valid affirmative defense of excuse.31 Even if the defendant is con-
victed, however, free will may still be an issue at the sentencing stage.
When imposing punishment, the traditional justifications have
been deterrence, rehabilitation, retribution, and incapacitation.32
These justifications are a combination of free will assumptions and
utilitarian rationales, as becomes evident when each justification is
examined in greater detail. For the sake of convenience, the four jus-
28. WESLEY CRAGG, THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT: TOWARDS A THEORY OF
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 30 (1992). It is not necessarily the case that the goal is the literal inflic-
tion of pain, but virtually all would agree that suffering is a secondary effect of incarceration.
29. Professor Henry M. Hart recognizes the role of blame in the American criminal law by
avowing that crime “is conduct which, if duly shown to have taken place, will incur a formal and
solemn pronouncement of the moral condemnation of the community.” Joel Feinberg, The Ex-
pressive Function of Punishment, in 4 PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 87, 91
(Jules L. Coleman ed., 1994) (quoting Henry M. Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 405 (Summer 1958)).
30. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 3.2(c) (3d ed. 2000).
31. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
32. Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment: A Retrospective
on the Past Century and Some Thoughts on the Next, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1 (2003) (character-
izing these four justifications as “textbook purposes of criminal punishment”).
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tifications are considered according to the degree to which each relies
on free will assumptions.
Of the four justifications, rehabilitation arguably relies on the
free will assumption the most. If a defendant is incapable of deter-
mining the course of her own actions, punishing her is not going to
transform her into an individual who avoids committing crimes.
Next on the free will continuum are deterrence and retribution.
Deterrence represents the belief that the goal of punishment is the
prevention of future crime, and can either be accomplished via the
individual (specific deterrence) or society as a whole (general deter-
rence).33 Specific deterrence presupposes that the defendant can exer-
cise free will because otherwise the punishment would not teach the
criminal to avoid that act in the future.34 General deterrence, how-
ever, does not presuppose that the individual defendant can exercise
free will, but it does arguably assume general free will.35 So long as
some members of society possess free will, those members can learn
from the defendant’s punishment to modify and control their own
conduct. Thus, it still might make sense for utilitarian reasons to con-
fine someone that does not possess free will because doing so would
send a message to those individuals who do.
Like deterrence, retribution can be understood in two different
ways. Some would say that the proper definition of retribution is “an
eye for an eye.”36 Adherents to this definition might see the question
of whether free will existed as a non-issue: someone who causes harm
to another should be made to suffer herself.37 Others would argue that
retribution is properly understood as desert, and desert “depends as
much or more on circumstances and personal characteristics as upon
physical actions and harm.”38 Proponents of the latter view would
have a hard time imposing punishment for circumstances beyond the
defendant’s control because there would be no sense of reciprocity.39
Last but not least, incapacitation also provides a justification for
33. Toni Massaro, Shame, Culture and American Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880, 1895–96
(1991).
34. See id. at 1896 (discussing the relationship between personality and deterrence).
35. See Michele Cotton, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313, 1316 (2000) (noting that fear of pun-
ishment is what allows criminal justice to have a deterrent effect).
36. Alschuler, supra note 32, at 19.
37. See id. (noting that some people perceive the object of retribution as “match[ing] pun-
ishment to harm”).
38. Id.
39. See id. (stating that the “eye for an eye” formula is “horrifying precisely because it does
not adequately take account of an offender’s culpability”).
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imposing punishment. Incapacitation, however, does not require the
court to make any assumptions about free will. A court may simply
conclude that it is in society’s best interests to remove a particular in-
dividual from society. When this happens, the rationale for imposing
punishment is then purely utilitarian.
In short, when imposing punishment, courts are often required to
make assumptions about free will, but there can be a utilitarian com-
ponent to their decisions as well.
II.  THE EFFECT OF GENETICS ON THE CRIMINAL LAW
Because free will is often a cornerstone of current criminal jus-
tice theory, any alteration of this concept could have major ramifica-
tions. Recent findings that individuals with certain genetic codes may
be more likely to commit violent crime become extremely important.
To be sure, they call into question the role that free, individual choice
plays in the commission of crime.40 It is important to understand the
results of these studies and how they correlate to theories of free will
and determinism.
A. Genetic Research Summarized
In the late 1960s, scientific research began to take place that illus-
trated a possible connection between various genetic factors and pro-
pensity for violent behavior in individuals.41 Studies found that, even
controlling for other factors, a disproportionate number of males with
the XYY chromosome were being held in maximum security prisons,
facilities reserved for the most violent of criminals.42 Although a gen-
eral connection was found, inconsistency in future studies,43 coupled
with a general reluctance to accept these “genetic excuses,” meant
40. The popularity of these studies also illustrates their importance. One study conducted
by the New York Times, the Washington Post, and the Los Angeles Times between 1984 and
1987 found that over four hundred articles were written in these newspapers relating genetic
makeup to human behavioral traits. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Dorothy Nelkin, The Juris-
prudence of Genetics, 45 VAND. L. REV. 313, 320 n.50 (1992) (citing Dorothy Nelkin, Heredi-
tarian Themes in Popular Culture (1991) (unpublished proposal to the National Institutes of
Health)). This study suggests that even when understanding was at a very primitive level, the
news value of such results was considered to be very significant. Id.
41. Herman A. Witkin et al., Criminality in XYY and XXY Men, 193 SCIENCE 547, 547–55
(1976).
42. Id.
43. A larger study found a disproportionate number of individuals with the XYY chromo-
some in criminal institutions, but found no evidence that there was any link between the chro-
mosome and violent behavior. Id. at 553–54.
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that courts rejected the XYY chromosome defense in criminal trials.44
Nevertheless, the study raised important questions about the role of
genetics in criminal behavior.
The next significant genetic research with implications for crimi-
nal law was Professor Han G. Brunner’s study of so-called “aggres-
sion” genes. Professor Brunner studied a large Dutch family that had
a significant number of men who were abnormally aggressive in their
behavior.45 The family was chosen because it exhibited “a sharp, un-
explainable behavioral contrast between affected and unaffected
males.”46 After controlling for a variety of different factors, Professor
Brunner discovered that the males who exhibited impulsive, aggres-
sive behavior such as rape, arson, and assault also had a mutation in
one of their genes.47 The male relatives carried a mutated aggressive
gene for monoamine oxidase (MAOA), an enzyme responsible for
metabolizing certain neurotransmitters. As a result, they had diffi-
culty coping with stressful situations.48 Scientists hailed Brunner’s
work as extremely important, possibly laying the groundwork for the
discovery of the gene for “aggression.”49 Although the long-term im-
plications of this research are unclear,50 Professor Brunner’s study is
important because it asserts that, not only is there a correlative effect
44. This defense was brought in a number of jurisdictions. See, e.g., People v. Yukl, 372
N.Y.S.2d 313, 319 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975) (rejecting a motion for the appointment of a genetic ex-
pert because “in New York an insanity defense based on chromosome abnormality should be
possible only if one establishes with a high degree of medical certainty an etiological relation-
ship between the defendant’s mental capacity and the genetic syndrome”); State v. Roberts, 544
P.2d 754, 758–59 (Wash. Ct. App. 1976) (examining the use of genetic defenses in the criminal
context and rejecting their future application).
45. H.G. Brunner et al., Abnormal Behavior Associated with a Point Mutation in the Struc-
tural Gene for Monoamine Oxidase A, 262 SCIENCE 578, 578 (1993).
46. Amanda Evansburg, Note, “But Your Honor, It’s in His Genes”: The Case for Genetic
Impairments as Grounds for a Downward Departure Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1565, 1571–72 (2001) (quoting Cecille Price-Huish, Comment, Born to
Kill? Aggression Genes and Their Potential Impact on Sentencing and the Criminal Justice Sys-
tem, 50 SMU L. REV. 603, 609 (1997)).
47. Id. at 1572.
48. Id.
49. Virginia Morell, Evidence Found for a Possible ‘Aggression Gene’, 260 SCIENCE 1722,
1722–23 (1993).
50. Due to difficulties in replicating this study, some have argued that the aggression gene
found in Professor Brunner’s study may only be applicable to the particular Dutch family.
Evansburg, supra note 46, at 1572. So although Professor Bruner’s research may not prove what
it initially argued, mainly, that there is a particular gene that in mutated form can lead to high
aggression, it still gives support to the widely held belief that genetics plays a role in abnormal
behavior. For a detailed look at some of the fallout of the Brunner study, see id., at 1572–74.
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between certain genes and violence, but that this effect is causal as
well.51
Despite this promising research, it is unlikely that the isolation of
any particular gene as the source of violent behavior will ever take
place. Geneticist David Cummings commented that “[m]y feeling is
there is certainly no ‘gene’ for criminal behavior. There are [only]
genes which predispose people to an increased frequency of impul-
sive-compulsive behaviors and that put them at greater risk of being
involved in criminal behavior.”52
Nevertheless, many scientists agree that violent behavior can be
traced in some part to the genetic makeup of the individual. For ex-
ample, numerous credible studies performed on mice, as well as other
studies of the brain, have identified certain hormonal levels, specifi-
cally nitric oxide, present in large amounts while the animal was en-
gaging in aggressive behavior.53 Mice with a decreased level of nitric
oxide synthase “‘don’t seem to recognize social cues which would
normally turn off reckless, impulsive or violent behavior.’”54 These
studies suggest that violent behavior may have at least some root in
genetic composition.55
B. The Resulting Concern
The result of this genetics research, which shows that certain in-
dividuals may be predisposed to violent behavior, strikes directly at
the core of the American criminal justice system. If an individual’s
genetic composition is such that, when stimulated by certain envi-
ronmental factors, she becomes more likely to exhibit aggressive be-
havior, it becomes difficult to define her behavior as being completely
“free.”
For example, if two individuals, X and Y, are confronted with the
same environmental stimuli,56 the American criminal justice system
51. Brunner et al., supra note 45, at 578.
52. Natalie Angier, Disputed Meeting to Ask If Crime Has Genetic Roots, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
19, 1995, at C1.
53. A study at Johns Hopkins identified high amounts of nitric oxide as the likely cause of
aggressive behavior. See Evansburg, supra note 46, at 1573 (identifying the study as proof of the
importance of genetic factors in determining behavior).
54. Id. (quoting Douglas Birch, Scientists Link Missing Gene in Mice to Violent Behavior;
Only Males Affected by Induced Defect, BALT. SUN, Nov. 23, 1995, at 1A).
55. For a more thorough (but also somewhat outdated) look at the various impacts of ge-
netic influences on criminal behavior, see generally LAWRENCE TAYLOR, BORN TO CRIME:
THE GENETIC CAUSES OF CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR (1984).
56. Because behavior is generally an interaction between biological and environmental
stimuli, if the two individuals do not have the same environmental stimuli, making any judg-
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treats them as if they have the same ability to make a choice to en-
gage or not engage in a crime. But what if person X’s genetic makeup
increases her likelihood of violent behavior by 70 percent, while per-
son Y has a “normal” genetic makeup that leads to no higher prob-
ability of violence? Arguably, person X does not have the ability to
make as free a choice, because a significant part of her decisionmak-
ing process is dictated by her genetic code, pushing her toward vio-
lence. To be fair, person X has a diminished ability to make the cor-
rect legal choice in comparison to person Y. Yet the current
American criminal justice system fails to recognize these genetic dif-
ferences, and proceeds as if both individuals had the same capacity to
control their choices. For this reason, any decisions to convict or
punish that rely exclusively on free will as a rationale are in error.
III.  CURRENT LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
With its fundamental foundations thus questioned, some legal
scholars have opined that a dramatic reordering of the criminal justice
system will take place soon.57 These scholars disagree about the extent
to which these changes will be positive. Yet, they agree that genetics
represents a unique set of problems for the criminal justice system.
Their arguments essentially follow three steps.
A. Genetics Plays an Integral Role in Human Behavior
Some legal scholars interpret recent scientific findings of possible
genetic links to traits such as aggression as proof that people are par-
tially “genetically determined.”58 Moreover, some studies59 have been
cited by legal scholars for the proposition that a level of “genetic es-
ments about their ultimate behavioral decision is scientifically invalid. Thus to truly evaluate
what effect genetics may play in criminal philosophy, one must assume that the environmental
backdrop is in a controlled setting.
57. E.g., Evansburg, supra note 46, at 1584; Steven I. Friedland, The Criminal Law Impli-
cations of the Human Genome Project: Reimagining a Genetically Oriented Criminal Justice
System, 86 KY. L.J. 303, 324–41 (1998); Marcia Johnson, Genetic Technology and Its Impact on
Culpability for Criminal Actions, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 443, 462–70 (1998); Nygaard, supra note
21, at 437; Price-Huish, supra note 46, at 611, 625.
58. Price-Huish, supra note 46, at 603. (noting that “violent criminal behavior . . . may be
the result of biological determinism as opposed to conscious choice-based decision making”).
59. See Patricia A. Brennan et al., Assessing the Role of Genetics in Crime Using Adoption
Cohorts, in GENETICS OF CRIMINAL AND ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOR 115–22 (Gregory A. Boch &
Jamie A. Goode eds., 1996) (chronicling adoption studies suggesting the link between genetics
and violence).
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sentialism” and “biological determinism” may exist in humans.60 One
scholar has even stated that genetic research may provide the most
complete and final explanation of behavior, thereby ending the age-
old puzzle as to why humans act the way they do.61 Many of these
scholars infer that genetics could or already does explain much of
human behavior, and that the more insight one gains into genetic in-
heritance, the more one can understand criminal behavior.62
B. Genetics Represents a Unique Problem for the Criminal Justice
System
Although there are slight differences among legal scholars re-
garding the implications of genetic research, they share a similar be-
lief that these genetic findings will lead the criminal justice system
into uncharted territory. Because genetics “causes” so much of hu-
man behavior, so their arguments go, the United States will be forced
to create a new system based on biological modes of conduct rather
than individual psychological decisionmaking.63 This will then under-
mine the American criminal justice system’s reliance on free will.64
Legislatures and courts, which have long defined criminal acts
and crafted punishment schemes based on the notion of culpability,
will have to justify these correctional measures, even though their
connection to individual responsibility has been shaken.65 In the past,
when presented with external factors that might hinder an individ-
ual’s ability to act freely, society has defined away the problem, by
creating legal exceptions such as duress and insanity.66 However, now,
for the first time, these genetic realities may force the American
criminal justice system to be almost entirely based on these excuse
60. Johnson, supra note 57, at 455. The conclusions that some legal scholars have made
about this science are different than those of the researchers themselves. Although they agree
that violent fathers and their offspring share a gene that may increase the risk of schizophrenia,
the scientists believe that the connection to violence could be based on a very complex combina-
tion of biological and environmental factors. Id. Thus the conclusion of “genetic essentialism”
does not seem to be shared by those who were engaged in the study. Id. at 455–60.
61. Friedland, supra note 57, at 308 (citing TED PETERS, PLAYING GOD? GENETIC
DETERMINISM AND HUMAN FREEDOM (1997)).
62. Id. (expounding on his belief of genetic essentialism); Johnson, supra note 57, at 455
(interpreting the studies as containing insight into criminal behavior).
63. Friedland, supra note 57, at 329.
64. Id.
65. Johnson, supra note 57, at 462.
66. See id. (noting that while the law generally presumes free will to impute criminal re-
sponsibility, it also “allow[s] deterministic influence of uncontrollable behavior as an exculpa-
tory defense or mitigation of punishment”).
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exceptions. This could lead to a completely unworkable system where
all are excused for every crime based upon their own individual pre-
dispositions.
C. The Criminal Justice System Must Be Modified or Revolutionized
Trusting the strong predictive value and uniqueness of genetics—
the argument progresses—the philosophical underpinnings of the cur-
rent system must be recast.67 At least one commentator has specu-
lated that society may even have to create a completely different set
of criminal laws.68 The result might be a partially deterministic system,
with gradual levels of legal accountability based on the sum of all fac-
tors impeding one’s behavior.69 If this happens, it may be necessary to
create an entirely new class of criminal defendants whose culpability
would be excused if genetic testing showed that they were incapable
of exercising free will.70 Because it would be impossible to find any
members of such a class guilty, society would need to find new ways
to balance its obligation to protect the public and still comply with ba-
sic notions of justice.71
Professor Steven Friedland argues that genetic discoveries may
also force society to fundamentally alter what it considers to be
criminal.72 As criminal behavior becomes more firmly rooted in the
genetic makeup of the individual, it follows that an alteration of the
underlying assumptions about what constitutes criminal responsibility
will be necessary.73 As genetics becomes more predictive of individu-
als’ behavioral patterns, science will develop a broader understanding
of what constitutes genetic normality by discovering what genetic pat-
terns occur most often in a population.74 Based on these genetic
codes, one can learn which behaviors are most common or normal in
a given society.75 This new and apparently improved normalcy will be
67. Id. at 462–70 (arguing that the current American criminal justice system will need to
undergo dynamic changes to allow for the societal necessity of response to criminal behavior).
68. Nygaard, supra note 21, at 430.
69. Id. at 433–34.
70. Id. at 462.
71. Johnson, supra note 57, at 470. Johnson expresses six possible options that society
could choose to undertake: (1) release the defendant back into society; (2) find the defendant
guilty but genetically impaired and confine him to a penal institution; (3) commit the defendant
to a genetic treatment center; (4) isolate the defendant in a genetic compound; (5) promulgate
genetic therapy; or (6) mitigate the punishment. Id.
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free from the boundaries of an individual’s circumstances or society’s
choices that are dependent upon its own particular culture.76 Rather,
the determination of normal behavior will be scientifically objective,
and will aid in assessing which individuals should be held responsible
for their actions.77 Presumably those individuals who do not possess
the normal genetic makeup will be held less culpable for the criminal
actions they committed, because their makeup deviated from the so-
cietal mainstream.
Professor Friedland further posits that an individual’s ability to
change her behavior over time, whether through rehabilitation or
change in environment will become “more questionable,” thus ren-
dering all punishment theories invalid.78 The implications of this ar-
gument are staggering. Professor Friedland is predicting a systematic
change not only in the decision of whether to punish, but also in the
definition of what constitutes being “normal.” Thus, scholars who
share Friedland’s view believe that “[o]ur way of life is destined to
change.”79 They see genetics as altering the concept of individual
choice and responsibility, thus revolutionizing the entire criminal jus-
tice system.80
IV.  THE EXISTING SCHOLARSHIP CRITIQUED
Legal scholars predicting the end to the current criminal justice
system are misguided for two reasons. First, they underestimate the
staying power of the criminal justice system and its past resilience in
the face of discoveries—mainly in the social sciences—that, arguably,
should have similarly shaken its foundations. Second, they do not
take into account the considerable role that punishment plays in act-




79. Nygaard, supra note 21, at 430–31.
80. See Friedland, supra note 57, at 333 (“Linking criminal behavior more firmly to genet-
ics would create a new set of underlying assumptions in the area of criminal responsibility.”).
Professor Friedland sees the possible problems of just such a system, and is in no way advocat-
ing its enactment. Id. at 365–66. He is merely making a prediction, and although it does seem to
be in an extreme form, his conclusions do not differ so substantially from other thought in the
area that his predictive work is unrepresentative.
81. In other words, such scholars fail to consider the extent to which at least a subset of so-
ciety subscribes to the “eye for an eye” definition of retribution. For a brief discussion of this
definition, see supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.
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sons, observations predicting the demise of the criminal justice system
would appear to be somewhat exaggerated.
A. The Sociological Experience with the Rotten Background Defense
In the last few decades, the American criminal justice system has
come to recognize that environmental and social factors have a strong
influence on the commission of criminal activity. A significant body of
recent criminological research demonstrates that the lowest socioeco-
nomic groups within society commit a disproportionate number of its
violent crimes.82 Economically impoverished communities tend to find
themselves increasingly isolated, creating large cycles of poverty that
have few escape possibilities for its members.83 Individuals who spend
their formative years under poor socioeconomic conditions, including
high rates of violent crime, are sure to have their motivations and de-
sires shaped by this background. It could be, as one scholar suggests,
that a person subjected to a life of social deprivation may end up
having as little control over her actions as one who is stricken with a
mental disease.84 If an individual has limited control over whether her
actions conform to the constructs of society, she (like those with vari-
ous genetic predispositions) may find herself without a true, free
choice. Recognizing these factors minimizing free will, many legal ad-
vocates of the 1970s proposed a rotten social background defense to
criminal prosecutions.
The most famous and eloquent proponent of this theory was
former Judge David Bazelon.85 Judge Bazelon recognized that the
American criminal justice system has free will as its core concept, and
that if social conditions in a person’s life have made it impossible for
her to have the ability to make lawful decisions, then the law should
82. Deborah W. Denno, Human Biology and Criminal Responsibility: Free Will or Free
Ride?, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 615, 646 (1988). Professor Denno does point out that there is a sig-
nificant amount of research that disputes the correlation between crime and socioeconomic
status. However, she makes it clear that this is the minority view and most research finds a sig-
nificant correlation at play. Id. n.174.
83. See R. George Wright, The Progressive Logic of Criminal Responsibility and the Cir-
cumstances of the Most Deprived, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 459, 481 (1994) (speaking to the contin-
ued problems that economic and social isolation visit upon society).
84. Kadish, supra note 2, at 284.
85. See United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923, 957–65 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (raising the question whether an African-American
youth who was raised in a socially deprived background could be held responsible for commit-
ting a crime in response to being the target of racial slurs). See generally David L. Bazelon, The
Morality of the Criminal Law, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 385 (1976).
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excuse her conduct.86 Judge Bazelon expanded upon this notion in a
robbery and assault case:
It may well be that we simply lack the resources—to say nothing of
the understanding—that would be required if those who stole to
feed their addiction were removed from the criminal process on the
ground that they are not responsible for their actions. But if this is
so, we should recognize the fact, and not rationalize our treatment
of narcotics addicts on the false premise that their crimes are the re-
sult of a wrongful exercise of free will. It is to me intolerable that
persons already crippled by an almost hopeless cycle of poverty, ig-
norance, and drugs should be further burdened by the moral stigma
of guilt, not because they are blameworthy, but merely because we
cannot afford to treat them as if they are not.87
Judge Bazelon’s insight regarding an individual’s inability to escape
her environment applies equally to the genetics context. Individuals
should not be blamed for genetic factors that limit their ability to ex-
ercise free will. Judge Bazelon concluded that it is intellectually dis-
honest to treat individuals as if they are creatures of their own free
will when significant evidence refutes this idea. He further argued
that the jury should hear evidence of all of the mental, emotional, and
social processes of the defendant so that they could determine if her
actual choice to commit a particular crime was voluntary.88 Regardless
of the efficacy of such a proposal, at least one judge has recognized
that social factors outside of one’s control can diminish one’s capacity
to execute one’s free will.
The theories of Judge Bazelon and other social determinists have
gained little popularity. The American criminal justice system cur-
rently does not recognize social deprivation as a legal excuse.89 Courts
have confronted and largely discounted or ignored sociological evi-
dence of behavioral causation.90 However, the criminal justice system
86. See Bazelon, supra note 85, at 398 (“The real question, it seems to me, is how we can
afford not to live up to our moral pretensions and not excuse unfree choices or nonblameworthy
acts.”) (emphasis omitted).
87. United States v. Carter, 436 F.2d 200, 210 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring)
(emphasis omitted).
88. Washington v. United States, 390 F.2d 444, 453 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
89. George Vuoso, Background, Responsibility, and Excuse, 96 YALE L.J. 1661, 1661
(1987).
90. See, e.g., United States v. Manzella, 791 F.2d 1263, 1269 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating that
“the temptation to obtain whatever gains, pecuniary or nonpecuniary . . . is a cause of the crime
but not a cause that exonerates the tempted from criminal liability if he yields, just as poverty is
not a defense to larceny”).
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may be more likely to integrate genetics because—unlike social sci-
ence—genetics is “hard” science.
Most legal scholars, judges and policy makers, intuitively give
greater credibility to the hard sciences (such as biology and chemis-
try) than the social sciences.91 United States v. Moore92 illustrates this
point. Moore involved an addiction defense to a crime of drug posses-
sion.93 The judges’ theories on the validity of free will were varied, but
both sides agreed that there must be hard scientific evidence before
they could justify an excuse. Judge Levanthal, writing for two mem-
bers of the majority rejecting the defense, said that, to justify excuse,
an individual must have a “disability that is both gross and verifi-
able.”94 Concurring, Judge Wilkey emphasized that, in considering de-
fenses, one must weigh the “physical craving” with the person’s
“strength of character.”95 It is noteworthy that both judges use words
such as “disability” and “physical,” implying that, for there to be a
justifiable excuse, it must come from the individual’s biological
makeup. Even Judge Wright in dissent recognized that, for an excuse
to be valid, it must come from a “disease” that has overcome an indi-
vidual’s decisionmaking process.96
The Moore case illustrates a broader principle seen in the law,
namely, that physical infirmities are much more likely to be met with
favor by the criminal justice system. Nevertheless, the sociological
experience of the 1970s and the struggle by the courts to incorporate
these findings into their jurisprudence demonstrate the resiliency of
the criminal justice system. Regardless of the exact impact that ge-
netics will have, the point remains that the criminal justice system is
naturally predisposed to distance itself from radical change.
B. Therapeutic Role of Punishment: Desire for Revenge
Along with underestimating the resiliency of the criminal justice
system, legal scholars also underestimate the therapeutic role that
punishment plays in American society. One of the key roles of the
criminal justice system is to act as an outlet for the revenge-based mo-
91. See, e.g., Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F.3d 1287, 1297 (8th Cir. 1997) (empha-
sizing that “there are social sciences in which the research, theories and opinions cannot have
the exactness of hard science methodologies”).
92. 486 F.2d 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc).
93. Id. at 1142.
94. Id. at 1180 (Levanthal, J., concurring) (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 cmt. at 6
(Tentative Draft No. 10, 1960)).
95. Id. at 1145 (Wilkey, J., concurring).
96. Id. at 1243 (Wright, J., dissenting).
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tives of the individual victim in particular, and the greater society in
general. The desire for revenge “is a current, deep American trait.”97
Seen in this light, revenge is a natural human trait, one that seeks the
expression of a deep, primitive desire to impose a counter bad act
upon those who have caused harm. When a person has been a victim
of cruelty, it is her natural inclination to seek to victimize the victim-
izer.98 The criminal justice system satisfies this desire by allowing the
victim and society to act upon their revenge through the imposition of
harsh criminal sentences.
The centrality of the role that revenge plays can be seen in deci-
sions such as Payne v. Tennessee,99 which make the individual charac-
teristics and suffering of the victim relevant to the sentencing deter-
minations of the criminal by the process of victim impact
statements.100 The statements attempt to illustrate the unique pain
that the particular victim feels, enabling the sentencing body to place
themselves in the shoes of these victims, thus rendering them capable
of enacting the necessary revenge. The centrality of revenge is thus so
widespread and pervasive in the criminal justice system that it could
be considered one of its central tenets.101 A criminal justice system
that incorporates genetic factors into its sentencing process will not
satisfy this desire for revenge, as there will be no way for the victim
and society to act upon their natural desires. By not accounting for
this desire in their vision of a future criminal justice system, current
legal scholars underestimate its role in current punishment. Any true
vision of a future American criminal justice system must consider the
role that revenge plays in the American system of punishment while
also integrating into it a projection of the effect of a radical change,
such as that of a supposed “genetic revolution.”
97. Bruce Ledewitz & Scott Staples, No Punishment Without Cruelty, 4 GEO. MASON U.
CIV. RTS. L.J. 41, 56 (1993).
98. See id. at 53 (noting the phenomenon of “victimizing the victimizer” in connection with
antislavery literature (citing PHILIP P. HALLIE, HORROR AND THE PARADOX OF CRUELTY 89
(1969)).
99. 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
100. See Ledewitz & Staples, supra note 97, at 54 (explaining Payne v. Tennessee by noting
the correlation between victim impact statements and revenge-based motives in penological de-
terminations).
101. See id. at 57 (arguing that the purposes of the criminal justice system are deterrence,
incapacitation, retribution, rehabilitation, and revenge).
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V.  THE LIKELY IMPACT OF GENETICS ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE
The status quo requires that numerous cursory conclusions be
drawn about free will, but the genetics research calls at least some of
those conclusions into question. Society has three choices: (1) it can
continue in its current approach—which would be intellectually dis-
honest; (2) it can change the system drastically; or (3) it can alter its
understanding of why it punishes to accommodate genetics research.
This Note first assumes both that the first choice is undesirable and
that, for the reasons set forth in Part IV, the criminal justice system
will not be drastically reordered. This Note then argues that society
will realign its basis for punishment—swinging back to utilitarian ra-
tionales—in order to address the import of recent genetic research.
The question then becomes how to conform to what genetics research
teaches while still making it possible to convict and punish those that
pose a threat to the rest of society. In other words, given that courts
and legislatures will not be able to rely on free will assumptions to the
same extent as they have in the past, where then can they turn to jus-
tify imposing punishment and still stay intellectually honest?
Utilitarian-based rationales provide an answer.102 For the utili-
tarian, the criminal law is an instrument of social education and moti-
vation.103 Utilitarians punish individuals not so much because of their
own culpability, but because they hope to avoid the conduct that
leads to societal harm.104 The goal is to deter future conduct not only
by the individual herself, but by society as a whole. Individuals are
part of a greater collective and must sacrifice their own individual lib-
erty for the greater good. Thus, under utilitarian conceptions of pun-
ishment, individual culpability is not a prerequisite to punishment.105
Their mere presence in society provides the necessary justification.
102. The utilitarian conception of punishment owes its roots to past thinkers, the most fa-
mous of whom is Jeremy Bentham. See David M. Estlund, Who’s Afraid of Deliberative Democ-
racy? On the Strategic/Deliberative Dichotomy in Recent Constitutional Jurisprudence, 71 TEX.
L. REV. 1437, 1438 (1993) (citing Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill as the founders of
modern utilitarianism).
103. MOUSOURAKIS, supra note 4, at 44.
104. Id.
105. The maintenance of some form of a criminal justice system is necessary for any free
society. Even the staunchest advocate of individual rights would likely recognize that society has
a valid objective in attempting to prevent socially harmful behavior. See id. (arguing that “for
the utilitarian, recognizing legal excuses is another requirement of a criminal law system con-
cerned with the maximization of general welfare, not with punishment of wrongdoers as such”).
There are gains that benefit all of society in preventing crime by punishing those who have
committed socially undesirable acts, even if they had little to no control over their decision.
073003 JONES.DOC 09/03/03  4:55 PM
2003] OVERCOMING THE MYTH OF FREE WILL 1051
There has always been an undertone of utilitarian thought in
American criminal justice theory.106 Justice Hugo Black once wrote
that the penal system served more interests than punishing an indi-
vidual:
Apart from the value of jail as a form of treatment, jail serves other
traditional functions of the criminal law . . . . [I]t gets the alcoholics
off the street, where they may cause harm in a number of ways to a
number of people, and isolation of the dangerous has always been
considered an important function of the criminal law.107
Justice Oliver Holmes expressed this notion even more bluntly:
If I were having a philosophical talk with a man I was going to have
hanged (or electrocuted) I should say, I don’t doubt that your act
was inevitable for you but to make it more avoidable by others we
propose to sacrifice you to the common good. You may regard your-
self as a soldier dying for your country if you like. But the law must
keep its promises.108
In short, to be philosophically valid, the critical question in deter-
mining punishment will no longer be the mens rea of the individual
committing crime, but rather, the effect that the commission of the
crime has on the general society.
Judge Richard Posner argues that as scientific research advances
and learns more about the roots of individual behavior, criminal re-
sponsibility becomes increasingly “external.”109 Society will worry less
about the intent of the person committing the crime and more about
what conduct has been undertaken.110 Even if one does not find Judge
Posner’s theories appealing,111 his argument that an individual’s be-
havior may be caused by something greater than her own culpability,
and that punishment may still be inflicted even when caused by out-
side factors, comports with the conclusions in this Note.
Utilitarian theory is open to many criticisms. Many argue that
any theory that is based on the greater good of the collective over the
106. See supra Part I.C (observing that utilitarian-based rationales are not new).
107. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 539 (1968) (Black, J., concurring).
108. Hill, supra note 6, at 2065 (1988) (quoting 1 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS: THE
CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND HAROLD J. LASKI, 1916–1935, at 806 (Mark
De Wolfe Howe ed., 1953)).
109. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 168–69 (1990).
110. Id.; see also Nygaard, supra note 21, at 433 (“There may be no excuse in law for what
one does even if there is a reason.”) (emphasis omitted).
111. Judge Posner’s discussions of humans as “unreasonably dangerous machines” do make
it difficult to accept him as a humanist. POSNER, supra note 109, at 168.
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rights of the individual is fundamentally flawed.112 Utilitarianism is
criticized for its adherence to the will of the majority, which can pro-
duce intolerance of minority views.113 The latter worry is especially
sharp in the area of criminal law, where often the individuals charged
have little in the way of resources necessary to advocate their rights to
the greater society.114
These critiques raise important issues and will likely have even
greater resonance in the context of genetic findings. Perhaps a socie-
tal consensus will emerge that some forms of individual compulsion,
whether based on genetics or social background, are so strong that
societies benefit little by punishing these individuals, and that they
should be able to put forward these “excuses.”115 At the same time
however, individuals also have a strong desire to be protected from
“victimhood,”116 and may then have little problem accepting the lesser
premium placed on individual culpability to achieve this goal. Utili-
tarian theory will thus fill the void created by the loss of the myth of
free will. Without individual choice, punishment will be justified by
appealing to the greater good and the maintenance of a better society.
This allows the criminal justice system to avoid the difficult questions
concerning the cause of actual behavior, and deal with the more sim-
plistic hope of “keeping the streets safe.”
112. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 291 (1986) (exposing the “defects in the
academic elaboration of [utilitarianism] by calling attention to moral convictions that remain
powerful even in hypothetical forms”).
113. See, e.g., John C. Duncan, Jr., The American ‘Legal’ Dilemma: Colorblind I/ Colorblind
II—The Rules Have Changed Again: A Semantic Apothegmatic Permutation, 7 VA. J. SOC.
POL’Y & L. 315, 354 (2000) (criticizing utilitarianism’s “‘inability to provide an adequate theo-
retical foundation for securing individual rights and the protection of minorities’”) (quoting
Frederick Rosen, Majorities and Minorities: A Classical Utilitarian View, in NOMOS XXXII
MAJORITIES AND MINORITIES (John W. Chapman & Alan Wertheimer, eds., 1990)).
114. This problem is likely the most difficult critique of utilitarian theory, and is also likely
the most difficult obstacle that will be necessary to overcome in future criminal jurisprudential
thought. The shift to utilitarian thought is not one based upon its normative value. Utilitarian
thought sacrifices much of the individuality that is necessary for the preservation of rights and
freedoms. Nevertheless, if the system of criminal justice is to maintain intellectual cohesion, the
shift is required. The hope is that those who are in charge of creating the system and maintain-
ing constitutional freedoms would recognize that some form of rights for the minority is of
benefit to society as a whole.
115. One could see how a debate would hinge on whether punishing those who are unable
to control themselves would help society by keeping them off the street or would be of no bene-
fit due to the negligible deterrent value. Jeremy Bentham goes as far as to say that excuses
should only be granted when there is no deterrent value available. Kadish, supra note 2, at 263
(citing JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 160–62 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1970)).
116. Ledewitz & Staples, supra note 97, at 51 (1993).
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CONCLUSION
It is clear with the recent advancements in the field of genetics
that the free will foundation upon which the criminal justice system is
based is in serious jeopardy. Justifications of punishment that rely on
the individual culpability of the actor become difficult to justify when
causal factors influence their behavior. Nevertheless, the maintenance
of social order is still an important goal for all societies. Current legal
scholarship recognizes this, but suggests that the American criminal
justice system is likely to implode due to the shattering of its founda-
tion in free will. For these scholars, the end result is a deterministic
system, destined to be unworkable and unacceptable to most of soci-
ety.
These scholars underestimate the resiliency of the criminal jus-
tice system. Genetic discoveries will alter the vision of what it means
to participate in criminal justice. The core acceptance of free will and
the corresponding dependence on individual responsibility will no
longer be embraced in American criminal jurisprudence. It is only the
utilitarian theory of punishment that can survive the implications of
genetic findings, while still providing a system that allows for the
maintenance of societal order and showcasing the human need to see
individual suffering. American criminal jurisprudence will thus focus
less on the individual and more on the greater society in evaluating
various modes of punishment.117 It is this radical reformulation as to
the very reason society punishes individuals that will be the true long-
term effect of the genetic revolution on criminal law.
117. In conclusion, it must be made clear that my argument is not normative. Depending on
how they are defined, utilitarian-based punishment rationales can lead to extremely harmful
results for civil liberties and the principle of individualized justice. Thus, I am not advocating
these rationales as philosophical justifications for punishment, but rather am predicting society’s
ultimate acceptance of them, regardless of their normative benefit.
